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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

Neal Beckman, Employee, Respondent,
v. 
Sysco Columbia, LLC, Employer, and Gallagher Bassett 
Services, Inc., Carrier, Petitioners. 
Appellate Case No. 2014-001691 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Appeal from the Appellate Panel 

South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission 

Opinion No. 27590 

Heard November 3, 2015 – Filed November 18, 2015 

DEPUBLISH THE OPINION OF THE COURT OF

APPEALS AND DISMISS CERTIORARI AS 

IMPROVIDENTLY GRANTED 

Kathryn Fiehrer Walton, of Wood Law Group, L.L.C., of 
Charleston, for Petitioners. 
Frederick W. Riesen, Jr., of Riesen Law Firm, L.L.P., of 
N. Charleston, and Stephen Benjamin Samuels, of 

Samuels Law Firm, L.L.C., of Columbia, both for 

Respondent. 
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PER CURIAM:  We granted the petition for a writ of certiorari to review 
the Court of Appeals' decision in Beckman v. Sysco Columbia, L.L.C., 408 S.C. 
501, 759 S.E.2d 750 (Ct. App. 2014).  We first direct the Court of Appeals to 
depublish its opinion and assign the matter an unpublished opinion number.  The 
above opinion shall no longer have any precedential effect.  Next, we dismiss as 
improvidently granted the writ of certiorari. 
Accordingly, we 
DEPUBLISH THE OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS AND
DISMISS CERTIORARI AS IMPROVIDENTLY GRANTED.
TOAL, C.J., PLEICONES, BEATTY, KITTREDGE and HEARN, JJ., 
concur. 
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

The State, Respondent, 
v. 
Jason Alan Johnson, Petitioner. 
Appellate Case No. 2014-002097 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Appeal From York County 

Lee S. Alford, Circuit Court Judge 

Opinion No. 27591 

Heard October 20, 2015 – Filed November 18, 2015 

DISMISSED AS IMPROVIDENTLY GRANTED  
Appellate Defender David Alexander, of Columbia, for 
Petitioner. 
Attorney General Alan Wilson and Assistant Attorney 
General William M. Blitch, Jr., both of Columbia, and 
Solicitor Kevin S. Brackett, of York, for Respondent. 
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PER CURIAM: We granted a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals'
decision in State v. Johnson, 410 S.C. 10, 763 S.E.2d 36 (Ct. App. 2014).  We now 
dismiss the writ as improvidently granted.   
DISMISSED AS IMPROVIDENTLY GRANTED. 
TOAL, C.J., BEATTY, KITTREDGE, HEARN, JJ., and Acting Justice James 
E. Moore, concur.
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina
In the Matter of Robert Andrew Hedesh, Respondent
Appellate Case No. 2015-002211 
ORDER 
On August 12, 2015, Respondent was suspended from the practice of law for a 
period of ninety days. He has now filed an affidavit requesting reinstatement 
pursuant to Rule 32, of the Rules for Lawyers Disciplinary Enforcement contained 
in Rule 413, SCACR. 
The request is granted and he is hereby reinstated to the practice of law in this 
state. 
BY: s/ Daniel E. Shearouse 
CLERK 
Columbia, South Carolina 
November 12, 2015 
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Court of Appeals 

The SPUR at Williams Brice Owners Association, Inc., 
Respondent, 
v. 
Sunil V. Lalla and Sharan W. Lalla, Appellants. 
Appellate Case No. 2013-001479 
Appeal From Richland County 

Clifton Newman, Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 5362 

Heard October 15, 2014 – Filed November 18, 2015 

 AFFIRMED 
S. Jahue Moore and John Calvin Bradley Jr., both of 
Moore Taylor Law Firm, P.A., of West Columbia, for 
Appellants. 
Brian Matthew Lysell, D. Reece Williams III, and W. 
Taylor Stanley of Callison Tighe & Robinson, LLC, of 
Columbia, for Respondent. 
MCDONALD, J.:  Sunil V. Lalla and Sharon W. Lalla (collectively, the Lallas), 
co-owners of a unit in a horizontal property regime known as The SPUR at 
Williams Brice Stadium (The SPUR), appeal the circuit court's order allowing The 
SPUR to enforce a restrictive covenant prohibiting the Lallas from renting their 
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unit to any student currently enrolled in a two or four-year college.  The Lallas 
argue the restriction has no reasonable basis and discriminates against a specific 
class of individuals. The Lallas further argue the circuit court erred in failing to 
hold the restrictive covenant null and void.  We affirm. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The SPUR is a horizontal property regime consisting of real property, 
condominiums, and general limited common areas.  The SPUR was created by 
master deed dated September 19, 2006 (Master Deed).  The SPUR at Williams
Brice Owners Association, Inc. (the Association) is a nonprofit corporation that 
exists for the sole purpose of administering The SPUR and enforcing The SPUR's 
Master Deed and bylaws pursuant to the South Carolina Horizontal Property Act.1
Article XIV of the Master Deed provides, in relevant part, the following: 
The rental of any unit to any student currently enrolled in 
a two (2) or four (4) year college, institute, or university 
is strictly prohibited.  Additionally, any tenant of any 
Unit shall be prohibited from having any roommate that 
is enrolled in a two (2) or four (4) year college, institute, 
or university.  Any tenant in violation of this Restriction 
shall have their lease automatically terminated, and shall 
have thirty (30) days to vacate the Unit.2
1 S.C. Code Ann. §§ 27-31-10 to -440 (2007 & Supp. 2014). 
2 Article XVI further provides:
However, any owner or owners may allow their child or 
grandchild to reside in, or rent, the Unit that they own, 
even if that child or grandchild is currently enrolled in a 
two (2) or four (4) year college, institute, or university. 
Additionally, the child or grandchild of any owner or 
owners who reside in, or rent out, their parents['] or 
grandparents['] Unit shall be entitled to have one (1) 
roommate who is also currently enrolled in a two (2) or 
four (4) year college, institute, or university. Nothing 
contained herein shall prevent a person . . . who is 
17 

  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                             
 
 
  
 
Landmark Resources, LLC (Landmark) has managed the Association since July 1, 
2007. 
In 2007, the Lallas purchased a three-bedroom condominium at The SPUR (Unit 
101) for $470,000. Sunil Lalla explained by affidavit that he "purchased the condo 
to enjoy football games at USC." When the Lallas purchased the unit, their 
daughter was considering attending college at the University of South Carolina.  
The Lallas intended for their daughter and two roommates to occupy Unit 101 
during their college years and planned to receive rental payments from their 
daughter's roommates. 
In 2008,3 the real estate market declined, and Unit 101, like homes across the 
United States, substantially decreased in value.  Despite their attempts, the Lallas 
were unable to sell the unit. At the time of the hearing in this matter, Unit 101 had 
been on the market for approximately four years.
During the summer of 2010, the Lallas notified the Association of their decision to 
rent to college students and began doing so.  The Association's board meeting 
minutes from June 3, 2010, indicate the following:
Management brought to the attention of the Board a 
comment form completed by an owner.  The comment
card stated that the Association is allowing the 
condominium to turn into a dormitory. . . .  After 
discussing the comment card [with] the Board[,] a motion 
was made to consult with [the] drafters of the Master 
Deeds as it pertains to rentals.  The motion was made to 
clarify the parameters of student rentals with the 
attorney—find out if a moratorium for students to rent 
can be placed immediately; motion was carried 
unanimously. 
enrolled in a two (2) or four (4) year college, institute, or 
university, from purchasing a Unit or becoming an owner 
thereof. 
3 During the summer of 2008, the Association adopted a set of rules and 
regulations that was distributed to each property owner at The SPUR.
18 

    
  
 
   
                                        
On July 6, 2010, Landmark sent notice to each owner regarding enforcement of the 
Master Deed provision barring rentals to unrelated college students. The notice
gave owners until May 31, 2011, to terminate any such leases.  
The February 11, 2011 board meeting minutes state that "[a] letter was presented to 
the [b]oard from an attorney on behalf of Unit #111[4] contesting the 
[Association's] Master Deed of enforcing rental requirements."  On May 25, 2011, 
Landmark sent another notice reminding owners that the Master Deed prohibited 
unit rentals to unrelated college students. Again, on July 14, 2011, the Association 
addressed the student rental issue in its board meeting minutes:  "To identify 
renter[s] who are attending a 2 or 4 year school, all owner[s] must have potential 
renters complete [an] application and forward that application to the Board for 
approval . . . The Board will also start enforcing the Rules and Regulations 
concerning renting units." 
On October 10, 2011, the Association filed this declaratory judgment action 
seeking interpretation and enforcement of the Master Deed and bylaws.  
Specifically, the Association asked that the circuit court find the Lallas were "in 
violation of the Master Deed by renting to a student or students and should be 
enjoined from doing so now or in the future."  The Association further sought an 
award of "costs and fees pursuant to [section 15-53-100 of the South Carolina 
Code (2005)] and Section XXIIIC of the Master Deed." 
The Lallas answered and counterclaimed, seeking a declaration that the restrictive 
covenant was null and void due to changed circumstances.  The parties agreed to 
have the circuit court rule on the outstanding issues without testimony.  The circuit 
court's order demonstrates that the parties had a "full opportunity" to create a 
record, present evidence through stipulated facts and affidavits, and present 
arguments through briefs. 
The circuit court granted the Association's request for declaratory relief, ruling that 
"[w]hen the [Lallas] purchased Unit 101, they became subject to the provisions of 
the Master Deed and [b]ylaws."  The Lallas appealed, asserting that the restrictions 
discriminate against a specific class of individuals (college students) and are 
unreasonable as there has been no damage to other property owners.  The Lallas 
further assert the circuit court erred in declining to hold the rental restriction null 
and void due to its unreasonableness and the changed economic circumstances 
4 This is not the unit at issue in this dispute. 
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depressing condominium values substantially below the 2007 purchase price.  
Finally, the Lallas contend the court erred in ruling their affirmative defense of 
waiver inapplicable and in enjoining the Lallas from continuing to rent Unit 101 to 
their current tenants. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW  
"Declaratory judgment actions are neither legal nor equitable and, therefore, the 
standard of review depends on the nature of the underlying issues."  Judy v. 
Martin, 381 S.C. 455, 458, 674 S.E.2d 151, 153 (2009).  "An action to enforce 
restrictive covenants by injunction is in equity."  S.C. Dep't of Nat. Res. v. Town of 
McClellanville, 345 S.C. 617, 622, 550 S.E.2d 299, 302 (2001); see also Cedar 
Cove Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. DiPietro, 368 S.C. 254, 258–59, 628 S.E.2d 284, 
286 (Ct. App. 2006). "In an action at equity, tried by a judge alone, an appellate 
court may find facts in accordance with its own view of the preponderance of the 
evidence." Inlet Harbour v. S.C. Dep't of Parks, Recreation & Tourism, 377 S.C. 
86, 91, 659 S.E.2d 151, 154 (2008). "However, we are not required to disregard 
the findings of the trial judge who saw and heard the witnesses and was in a better 
position to judge their credibility." Straight v. Goss, 383 S.C. 180, 192, 678 S.E.2d 
443, 449 (Ct. App. 2009). "Moreover, the appellant is not relieved of his burden of 
convincing the appellate court the trial judge committed error in his findings."  
Pinckney v. Warren, 344 S.C. 382, 387–88, 544 S.E.2d 620, 623 (2001).  In an 
action for declaratory relief, the burden of proof rests with the party seeking the 
declaration, and that party must meet its burden by a greater weight or 
preponderance of the evidence. See Vt. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Singleton, 316 S.C. 5, 10, 
446 S.E.2d 417, 421 (1994); see also Menne v. Keowee Key Prop. Owners' Ass'n, 
Inc., 368 S.C. 557, 564, 629 S.E.2d 690, 694 (Ct. App. 2006).    
LAW AND ANALYSIS 
I. Restrictive Covenant 
The Lallas argue the circuit court erred in determining that they failed to meet their 
burden of establishing that the restrictive covenant is unreasonable and 
unenforceable. We disagree. 
"Restrictive covenants, sometimes referred to as 'real covenants,' are agreements 'to 
do, or refrain from doing, certain things with respect to real property.'" Kinard v. 
Richardson, 407 S.C. 247, 257, 754 S.E.2d 888, 893 (Ct. App. 2014).  "Restrictive 
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covenants are contractual in nature, and thus, the language used in the restrictive 
covenant is to be construed according to its plain and ordinary meaning."  Penny 
Creek Assocs., LLC v. Fenwick Tarragon Apartments, LLC, 375 S.C. 267, 271, 651 
S.E.2d 617, 620 (Ct. App. 2007). Restrictions on the use of property are 
historically disfavored. Sea Pines Plantation Co. v. Wells, 294 S.C. 266, 270, 363 
S.E.2d 891, 893 (1987). "The historical disfavor of restrictive covenants by the 
law emanates from the widely held view that society's best interests are advanced 
by encouraging the free and unrestricted use of land."  Rhodes v. Palmetto Pathway 
Homes, Inc., 303 S.C. 308, 311, 400 S.E.2d 484, 485 (1991).
The law governing the enforceability of covenants restricting the use of real 
property is well-established in South Carolina.  "A restriction on the use of the 
property must be created in express terms or by plain and unmistakable 
implication, and all such restrictions are to be strictly construed, with all doubts 
resolved in favor of the free use of property."  Buffington v. T.O.E. Enters., 383 
S.C. 388, 392, 680 S.E.2d 289, 291 (2009).  In order to enforce a restrictive 
covenant, "a party must show that the restriction applies to the property either by 
the covenant's express language or by a plain and unmistakable implication."  Id.; 
see also Sea Pines Plantation Co., 294 S.C. at 269, 363 S.E.2d at 894 ("A 
restrictive covenant will be enforced if the covenant expresses the party's intent or 
purpose, and this rule will not be used to defeat the clear express language of the 
covenant."). "Courts shall enforce such covenants unless they are indefinite or 
contravene public policy."  Sea Pines Plantation Co., 294 S.C. at 270, 363 S.E.2d 
at 894. As with any other action on a contract, the party who seeks to enforce a 
restrictive covenant has the burden of proving that the non-moving party intended 
to create a covenant.  Charping v. J.P. Scurry & Co., 296 S.C. 312, 314, 372 
S.E.2d 120, 121 (Ct. App. 1988). 
In their answer, the Lallas admit they own a unit in The SPUR, and that they are 
subject to the provisions of the Master Deed and bylaws.  Under article VIII of the 
Master Deed, "every Condominium . . . is hereby . . . subject to the restrictions, 
easements, conditions, and covenants prescribed and established herein."  
Furthermore, the bylaws established by the Association provide that "[a]ll present 
or future co-owners . . . are subject to the regulations set forth in these [bylaws]
and in said Master Deed."  Under the South Carolina Horizontal Property Act, 
"[e]ach co-owner shall comply strictly with the bylaws . . .  and with the covenants, 
conditions and restrictions set forth in the master deed."  S.C. Code Ann. § 27-31-
170 (2007). In reviewing the Lallas' admissions, The SPUR's Master Deed, the 
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Association's bylaws, the pertinent statutes, and the circuit court's order, we find no 
error in the circuit court's ruling that "when the [Lallas] became owners of a unit in 
[The SPUR], they voluntarily and intentionally bound themselves by the restrictive 
covenants barring the rental of any unit to college students who are unrelated to the 
unit's owner."  Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's ruling that the rental ban 
provision of the restrictive covenant is binding upon the Lallas.   
II. The Lallas' Affirmative Defenses  
Upon the Association's showing that the restrictive covenant was binding on the 
Lallas, the Lallas bore the burden of asserting affirmative defenses to the restrictive 
covenant's enforceability.  See Circle Square Co. v. Atlantis Dev. Co., 267 S.C. 
618, 628, 230 S.E.2d 704, 708 (1976).  The circuit court ruled the restrictive 
covenant does not contravene public policy, as it neither unconstitutionally 
discriminates nor violates the statutory laws of the United States or the State of 
South Carolina. The circuit court further opined that a change in market conditions 
is not a valid defense to the enforcement of a restrictive covenant. 
A. Unreasonable Restrictions 
On appeal, the Lallas argue the circuit court erred in failing to find the restrictive 
covenant unenforceable because it is unreasonable.  We disagree. 
Part of the Lallas' argument on this point is that "[t]his class of currently enrolled 
college students is indistinguishable from college students who are children and 
grandchildren of owners or their roommates.  This class is indistinguishable from 
college students who are condo owners."  It does not appear that the circuit court 
addressed this particular "reasonableness" argument. See Staubes v. City of Folly 
Beach, 339 S.C. 406, 412, 529 S.E.2d 543, 546 (2000) ("It is well-settled that an 
issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and 
ruled upon by the [circuit] court to be preserved for appellate review.").  Moreover, 
the Lallas did not move for reconsideration of this issue under Rule 59(e), SCRCP.  
See Noisette v. Ismail, 304 S.C. 56, 58, 403 S.E.2d 122, 124 (1991) (finding issue 
was not preserved where the trial judge did not explicitly rule on the appellant's
argument and the appellant did not raise the issue in a Rule 59(e), SCRCP, motion 
to alter or amend the judgment); West v. Newberry Elec. Coop., 357 S.C. 537, 543, 
593 S.E.2d 500, 503 (Ct. App. 2004) (stating an issue that is neither addressed by 
the trial judge in a final order nor raised by way of a Rule 59(e), SCRCP, motion is 
not preserved for review). Thus, we conclude the question of whether South 
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Carolina should incorporate a separate reasonableness test—as distinguished from
the "rational basis" equal protection analysis—regarding the enforceability of 
restrictive covenants in the Master Deed of a horizontal property regime is 
unpreserved.5
B. Equal Protection6
The Lallas argue the rental restriction is impermissibly discriminatory and violates 
the Equal Protection Clauses of article I, section 3 of the South Carolina 
Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.  We 
disagree. 
Article I, section 3 of the South Carolina Constitution provides, in pertinent part, 
that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of 
law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws."  S.C. Const. 
art. I, § 3; see also Sunset Cay, LLC v. City of Folly Beach, 357 S.C. 414, 428, 593 
5 In Dunes W. Golf Club, LLC v. Town of Mount Pleasant, our supreme court 
clarified that "the equal protection clause does not prohibit different treatment of 
people in different circumstances under the law."  401 S.C. 280, 294–95, 737 
S.E.2d 601, 608–09 (2013) (quoting Harbit v. City of Charleston, 382 S.C. 383, 
396, 675 S.E.2d 776, 782–83 (Ct. App. 2009)); see also Town of Hollywood v. 
Floyd, 403 S.C. 466, 480–81, 744 S.E.2d 161, 168 (2013) (recognizing 
clarification). As this is precisely the prohibition the Lallas propose as a defense to 
enforcement in asserting that family-member and unit-owning college student 
residents are indistinguishable from the non-related college student class barred by 
the rental restriction, they would be unable to prevail on the merits of this
argument as well. 
6 "The general rule, well established in South Carolina, is that courts will not 
enforce a contract when the subject matter of the contract or an act required for 
performance violates public policy as expressed in constitutional provisions, 
statutory law, or judicial decisions."  White v. J.M. Brown Amusement Co., 360 
S.C. 366, 371, 601 S.E.2d 342, 345 (2004); see also Batchelor v. Am. Health Ins. 
Co., 234 S.C. 103, 108, 107 S.E.2d 36, 38 (1959) (holding contracts violating 
public policy as expressed in constitutional provisions, statutes, or judicial 
decisions are void). 
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S.E.2d 462, 469 (2004). Similarly, the Equal Protection Clause of the United 
States Constitution provides that "[n]o state shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."  U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.  While 
the private acts and agreements of individuals do not implicate the Equal 
Protection Clause, "the action of state courts and of judicial officers in their official 
capacities is to be regarded as action of the State within the meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment."  Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14 (1948) (holding the 
states denied petitioners the equal protection of the laws in granting judicial 
enforcement of certain restrictive agreements).  Therefore, for a restrictive 
covenant to be judicially enforceable, it must not discriminate on the basis of a 
classification that, if applied by the state, would contravene either the state or 
federal Equal Protection Clause. 
"To satisfy the equal protection clause, a classification must (1) bear a reasonable 
relation to the purpose sought to be achieved, (2) members of the class must be 
treated alike under similar circumstances, and (3) the classification must rest on 
some rational basis." Sunset Cay, 357 S.C. at 428, 593 S.E.2d at 469. Use of a 
classification will be declared unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause 
"if its repugnance to the Constitution is clear beyond a reasonable doubt."  Taylor 
v. Medenica, 331 S.C. 575, 578, 503 S.E.2d 458, 460 (1998).  "Where an alleged 
equal protection violation does not implicate a suspect class or abridge a 
fundamental right, the rational basis test is used."  Dunes W. Golf Club, LLC, 401 
S.C. at 293, 737 S.E.2d at 608; see also Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 
562, 564 (2000); Sunset Cay, 357 S.C. at 428–29, 593 S.E.2d at 469.  "In a case 
such as this, the rational basis standard, rather than strict scrutiny, applies because 
the classification at issue does not affect a fundamental right and does not draw 
upon inherently suspect distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage."  Harbit, 
382 S.C. at 396, 675 S.E.2d at 783.
An inherently suspect classification is one whose members have faced a long 
history of discrimination, see Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984); whose 
members are a discrete and insular minority who would otherwise be unheard by 
the political process, see United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 
152 n.4 (1938); or which is drawn according to an immutable trait acquired at 
birth, see Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973). We agree with the 
circuit court that because college students have not faced a long history of 
discrimination, are not an insular minority, and have not been classified according 
to an immutable trait acquired at birth, a classification based upon an individual's 
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status as a college student is not inherently suspect.  Thus, we conclude the circuit 
court correctly applied a rational basis analysis in rejecting the Lallas' equal 
protection claim. 
A classification bears a rational relationship to its purpose as long as there is some 
evidence that it will further a legitimate purpose.  See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 
U.S. 1, 10 (1992) (explaining that the Equal Protection Clause is satisfied so long 
as there is a plausible policy reason for the classification, the facts on which the 
classification is based rationally may have been considered to be true by the 
decision maker, and the relationship of the classification to the goal is not so 
attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational); see also Whaley v. 
Dorchester Cty. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 337 S.C. 568, 576, 524 S.E.2d 404, 408 
(1999) (noting a legitimate government interest exists in limiting traffic and 
protecting aesthetic values in residential areas).   
A classification may withstand rational basis review even if it is underinclusive or 
overinclusive, so long as the classification is not arbitrary. See Ry. Express Agency 
v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109–10 (1949) (finding a traffic regulation satisfied 
rational basis review even though it prohibited motorists from selling general 
advertising space on their vehicles but allowed business owners to advertise their 
products on vehicles engaged in that business); id. at 110 ("It is no requirement of 
equal protection that all evils of the same genus be eradicated or none at all."); 
N.Y.C. Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 592–94 (1979) (holding the 
exclusion of those in methadone maintenance programs from employment in the 
Transit Authority was constitutionally permissible even though many participants 
would be able to perform the requisite job functions safely); Vance v. Bradley, 440 
U.S. 93, 108–09 (1979) (holding mandatory retirement age constitutional despite 
the statute being underinclusive in failing to remove from employment some 
younger individuals who were no longer qualified to continue working and 
overinclusive in removing from employment those who were older but still 
capable). 
The purpose of the restrictive covenant's classification in this case is to ensure the 
comfort and safety of The SPUR's residents and protect the investments of 
property owners by minimizing the risk of creating a dormitory-like atmosphere at 
the complex.  The rental prohibition is rationally related to its purpose because it 
bars from the pool of possible renters a population that the Association alleges has 
a tendency to engage in certain behaviors dangerous to themselves and disruptive 
to those around them.  The fact that some potential renters barred by the college 
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student prohibition might not be disruptive or disorderly does not render the 
classification itself arbitrary or constitutionally violative.  See, e.g., Beazer, 440 
U.S. at 592–94. 
Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's well-reasoned opinion that the restrictive 
covenant satisfies both the federal and state equal protection clauses because it is 
"rationally related to maintaining the safety, comfort, and investment of owners."  
C. Fair Housing Protections7
The Lallas further argue that the circuit court erred in enforcing the Association's 
rental restriction because it is unreasonable, discriminatory, and seeks to prohibit 
an ordinary class of people from access to housing accommodations in violation of 
state and federal law. We disagree. 
The federal Fair Housing Act and South Carolina Fair Housing Law prohibit 
discrimination in the rental of a dwelling based upon a person's race, color, 
religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.  See S.C. Code Ann. § 31-21-40 
(2007); 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2012).  Within both statutes, "'familial status' means one 
or more individuals (who have not attained the age of eighteen years) being 
domiciled with--(1) a parent or another person having legal custody of such 
individual or individuals; or (2) the designee of such parent or other person having 
such custody . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 3602(k) (2012); see S.C. Code Ann. § 31-21-
30(6)(a) (2007). 
Here, the rental restriction is wholly unrelated to any classification protected by 
state and federal housing laws. See, e.g., Tufano v. One Toms Point Lane Corp., 
64 F.Supp.2d 119, 126 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that where a plaintiff's amended 
complaint failed to allege discrimination based upon one of the six "denominated 
determinants" there was no discriminatory nexus and his Fair Housing Act claim
must be dismissed).  Thus, we affirm the circuit court's ruling that the restrictive 
covenant is neither unconstitutionally discriminatory nor violative of state or 
federal law. 
7 See United States Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631; South Carolina 
Fair Housing Law, S.C. Code Ann. §§ 31-21-10 to -150 (2007 & Supp. 2014).
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D. Change in Economic Circumstances 
The Lallas argue the circuit court erred in failing to hold the Association's 
restrictions null and void as the change in economic conditions, specifically the 
decline in the real estate market following their purchase of the Unit, renders 
enforcement of the restrictions unreasonable. We disagree. 
"Under South Carolina law, a party may bring a declaratory judgment action to 
invalidate a restrictive covenant based on a change of conditions."  Menne, 368 
S.C. at 564, 629 S.E.2d at 694.  "[A]ffirmative relief may be granted against a 
restrictive covenant where there is such a change in the character of the 
neighborhood as to render the enforcement of the covenant valueless to the 
covenantee and oppressive and unreasonable as to the covenantor."  Id. However, 
South Carolina courts have been hesitant to terminate a restrictive covenant on the 
basis of a change in conditions.  Id.; Shipyard Prop. Owners' Ass'n v. 
Mangiaracina, 307 S.C. 299, 308–09, 414 S.E.2d 795, 801 (Ct. App. 1992).  "A 
party seeking to annul a restrictive covenant must show the change of conditions 
represented so radical a change that the original purpose of the restrictive covenant 
can no longer be realized." Menne, 368 S.C. at 564, 629 S.E.2d at 694.
Notwithstanding the changed character, when one protected by a covenant seeks 
enforcement thereof, we cannot endorse the change while the purpose of the 
covenant may still be accomplished.  Circle Square Co., 267 S.C. at 631, 230 
S.E.2d at 709.
In Buffington, our supreme court reviewed an order enjoining the operators of a 
Toyota dealership from using their real property—located across from the 
dealership and within a subdivision—for commercial purposes. 383 S.C. at 390, 
680 S.E.2d at 290. Certain lots within the subdivision, including the lots owned by 
the dealership operators, were subject to a restrictive covenant limiting their use to 
residential purposes. Id. at 390–91, 680 S.E.2d at 290. In examining the equities 
relating to enforcement of the covenant, the court concluded it would be 
inequitable to consider the dealership operators' financial loss in purchasing and 
improving their land because they were on notice of the subdivision's restriction 
prohibiting any use other than residential when they purchased it.  Id. at 393, 680 
S.E.2d at 291. The Buffington court further found that to ignore the restriction, in 
the absence of evidence to support lifting the restriction based on equitable 
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 doctrines, "would eliminate a homeowner's justified reliance on property 
restrictions." Id. at 393–94, 680 S.E.2d at 291–92. 
In this case, the purpose of the restrictive covenant is to ensure the safety of The 
SPUR's residents as well as the value of the unit owners' investments.  The units' 
decrease in value due to the declining real estate market and economy had no 
effect on the Association's need to minimize the risk that The SPUR might develop 
a dormitory-like atmosphere.  Like the dealership operators in Buffington, when the 
Lallas purchased their unit, they were on notice (by way of the Master Deed) of the 
restrictive covenant prohibiting the rental of any unit to college students unrelated 
to the unit's owner.  Accordingly, we agree with the circuit court that the economic 
change in conditions alleged by the Lallas fails to support the discharge of the 
restrictive covenant. 
E. Waiver 
The Lallas argue the circuit court erred in ruling that the affirmative defense of 
waiver was unavailable in this case.  We disagree. 
"Waiver is a voluntary and intentional abandonment or relinquishment of a known 
right. It may be expressed or implied by a party's conduct, and it may be applied to 
bar a party from relying on a statute of limitations defense."  Parker v. Parker, 313 
S.C. 482, 487, 443 S.E.2d 388, 391 (1994) (citation omitted).  "An implied waiver 
results from acts and conduct of the party against whom the doctrine is invoked 
from which an intentional relinquishment of a right is reasonably inferable."  Lyles 
v. BMI, Inc., 292 S.C. 153, 158–59, 355 S.E.2d 282, 285 (Ct. App. 1987).  The 
party asserting waiver has the burden of proof. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. 
v. Driver, 317 S.C. 471, 478, 451 S.E.2d 924, 929 (Ct. App. 1994).  "Generally, the 
party claiming waiver must show that the party against whom waiver is asserted 
possessed, at the time, actual or constructive knowledge of his rights or of all the 
material facts upon which they depended." Janasik v. Fairway Oaks Villas 
Horizontal Prop. Regime, 307 S.C. 339, 344, 415 S.E.2d 384, 387–88 (1992).  
Here, the circuit court determined that the Lallas failed to produce any evidence to 
support a waiver defense. See Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 317 S.C. at 478, 
451 S.E.2d at 929 ("Waiver, like estoppel, is an affirmative defense and the burden 
of proof is upon the party who asserts it.").  The Lallas contend the circuit court 
ignored the evidence in the record that the Association allowed other non-related 
students to live at The SPUR. However, we find that even if the Association 
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previously failed to monitor the rental of units, the record reflects that, upon 
receiving a complaint, the Association took action to enforce the restrictive 
covenant prohibiting rentals to unrelated college students.  Therefore, the circuit 
court properly found no waiver by the Association of its right to enforce the rental 
restriction. See, e.g., King v. James, 388 S.C. 16, 30, 694 S.E.2d 35, 42–43 (Ct. 
App. 2010) (finding waiver defense inapplicable and explaining that "for a party to 
waive a right, the party must have known of the right and known that the right was 
being abandoned."). Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's finding that waiver 
is inapplicable. 
III. Injunction 
In their reply brief, the Lallas argue the circuit court erred in enjoining them from
continuing to rent their unit to their current tenants.  We find this argument is not 
properly before the court.  See Glasscock, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 348 S.C. 
76, 81, 557 S.E.2d 689, 692 (Ct. App. 2001) ("[A]n argument made in a reply brief 
cannot present an issue to the appellate court if it was not addressed in the initial 
brief."). 
CONCLUSION 
The circuit court properly held the rental prohibition of Article XIV of the Master 
Deed and Restrictive Covenant to be valid and enforceable.  The circuit court's 
enjoining of the Lallas from renting, or continuing to rent, their unit in violation of 
the restrictive covenant was likewise proper.  Accordingly, the ruling of the circuit 
court is 
AFFIRMED.
WILLIAMS and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.
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MCDONALD, J.:  BJC Enterprises, LLC (BJC), Wendy Jones Bellamy, and 
Americana, Inc. a/k/a Americana Motel of Myrtle Beach, Inc. (Americana) 
(collectively, Appellants) seek appellate review of several orders,1 arguing the 
circuit court erred in (1) granting First Palmetto Savings Bank's (Palmetto) motion 
for summary judgment as to Appellants' third-party claims; (2) granting Hotel and 
Motel Holdings, LLC's (H&M) motion for summary judgment as to Appellants'
counterclaims; (3) granting Jack Jones, Donald Godwin, and Bhupendra Patel's 
(collectively, Individual Respondents) motion to dismiss; and (4) granting H&M's 
motion to strike Appellants' request for a jury trial on H&M's cause of action for 
claim and delivery.  We affirm.
FACTS/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 14, 2005, Palmetto made a $5,573,146.62 loan (Loan) at a 5.550% 
interest rate to BJC for the purpose of purchasing Emerald Shores Motel and its 
first row parking lot (collectively, Emerald Shores).  BJC's members included 
managing member Wendy Jones Bellamy, Bellamy's brother Harvey L. Jones 
(Brother), and family friend Henry C. "Trip" Coan, III.  In addition to the 2005 
Loan, BJC used $1,000,000 in cash contributed by Coan for the $6,900,000 
purchase. Prior to obtaining this loan, Bellamy, Brother, and their family, through 
the corporation Americana, owned and operated a neighboring motel known as 
Rainbow Court Motel, along with various other rental properties in the vicinity. 
The terms of the note (2005 Note) called for "23 monthly interest payments 
ranging from $23543.01 to $26065.48 beginning 02-14-2005 and 1 payment of 
$5,606,065.48 on 01-14-2007." The 2005 Note was secured by a commercial 
security agreement and three assignments of leases and rents (2005 Assignments).  
The 2005 Note was further secured by three mortgages (2005 Mortgages): (1) the 
1 This consolidated appeal addresses seven circuit court orders.   
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Emerald Shores mortgage, consisting of four property parcels mortgaged by BJC; 
(2) a mortgage on Rainbow Court and various rental properties, consisting of nine 
parcels mortgaged by Americana; and (3) a mortgage by Bellamy on a rental 
duplex. Palmetto perfected its security interest on January 19, 2005, by filing a 
UCC-1 financing statement (UCC-1) as to "[a]ll furniture, fixtures and equipment 
located at 404 N. Ocean Blvd., Myrtle Beach, SC 29577 and used in the operation 
of the Emerald Shores Motel." As additional collateral, Coan posted a $500,000 
certificate of deposit (CD), and Bellamy, Brother, and Coan executed personal 
guarantees for BJC's obligations under the 2005 Note.
On January 12, 2007, Palmetto renewed the Loan at an 8.25% interest rate and 
executed a new promissory note (2007 Note). The terms of the 2007 Note called 
for "11 monthly interest payments ranging from $35271.15 to $38050.20 
beginning 02-12-2007, and 1 payment of $5,612,198.82 on 01-12-2008."  The 
2007 Note was secured by the 2005 Mortgages and the 2005 commercial security 
agreement.  In her capacity as BJC's managing member, Bellamy executed three 
mortgage modifications, and all three BJC members executed personal guarantees. 
On January 17, 2008, Palmetto again renewed the Loan at the 8.25% interest rate, 
executed a new promissory note (2008 Note), and executed a new commercial 
security agreement (2008 CSA). The terms of the 2008 Note called for "11 
monthly payments of $47,905.19 beginning 02-17-2008, and 1 balloon payment of 
$5,509,352.46 on 01-17-2009." The 2008 Note was secured by the 2005 
Mortgages, the 2005 Assignments, and a commercial security agreement.  In her 
capacity as BJC's managing member, Bellamy again executed mortgage 
modifications, and all three members again executed personal guarantees.  
Throughout 2008, BJC was late on its monthly payments and eventually ceased 
making payments in October 2008. In mid-October, BJC met with Palmetto to 
discuss the 2008 Note. At this meeting, Palmetto indicated that it was not willing 
to renew the 2008 Note for another year, and that it expected BJC to make the 
balloon payment of $5,509,352.46 on January 17, 2009. Despite the fact that 
neither Bellamy nor BJC were financially capable, Bellamy informed Palmetto that 
she would be able to make the payment "in a relatively short period of time."  
This series of events culminated in Bellamy's attempted suicide on November 3, 
2008. Bellamy testified in her deposition that she attempted suicide to make her 
$5,500,000 life insurance policy proceeds available to pay off the 2008 Note and 
save her family's properties.  Following her release from Grand Strand Regional 
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Medical Center, Bellamy was involuntarily hospitalized in Florence for fourteen 
days. Thereafter, she remained under psychiatric care for approximately two years 
in Myrtle Beach. Subsequently, Bellamy was not involved with the management 
of Emerald Shores or Rainbow Court, nor was she involved in further efforts to 
renegotiate or extend the 2008 Note.  
In November 2008, Brother and Coan agreed to bring current the payments on the 
2008 Note, and Palmetto agreed to continue negotiations for a possible renewal of 
the 2008 Loan. In a November 24, 2008 letter to BJC, Palmetto offered to extend 
the 2008 Note for one year, reduce the interest rate to 7%, and require interest-only 
payments. Appellants claim they never received this letter because it was mailed 
to Rainbow Court while Bellamy was incapacitated, and the motel was closed for 
the season.2 Palmetto contends that it mailed the letter to Rainbow Court because 
the motel's address is the address of record set forth in the loan documents (Loan 
Documents). 
On December 9, 2008, Bellamy signed a durable power of attorney (POA) in favor 
of her paternal uncle, Jack Jones (Uncle). At this point, Uncle took over all 
negotiations on the 2008 Note; he faxed a copy of the POA to Palmetto's corporate 
headquarters on December 15, 2008.  Appellants allege that neither Uncle nor 
Palmetto advised them of the November 24, 2008 offer.
When the 2008 Note matured on January 17, 2009, BJC failed to make the 
required balloon payment. On January 22, 2009, Brother, Coan, and Uncle (in his 
capacity as Bellamy's POA) attended a meeting at Palmetto's headquarters in 
Camden.  At this meeting, Palmetto's President and CEO, Sammy Small, Sr., 
advised the parties that he planned to liquidate Coan's $500,000 CD and apply it to 
the principal due on the 2008 Note. Appellants claim that Uncle and Small left the 
room to speak privately and never divulged the substance of their conversation.
Later in January, Brother and Uncle returned to Camden for another meeting with 
Small. Brother alleges that Uncle and Small once again met privately and failed to 
divulge the substance of their conversation. 
In addition to these private meetings, Uncle began having regular contact with 
Small including, but not limited to, approximately 115 phone calls between 
2 According to Appellants, Rainbow Court and Emerald Shores are seasonal hotels, 
generally open only from Memorial Day weekend through Labor Day.  
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January 22, 2009, and June 30, 2009. Appellants claim that Uncle and Small kept 
secret communications regarding the 2008 Note and the three mortgaged 
properties. They further allege that Uncle and Small led them to believe that they 
were "negotiating in good faith to achieve a restructuring, renewal, or workout of 
the 2008 Note . . . and to prevent foreclosure on the properties."   
On February 2, 2009, Palmetto initiated an action against BJC, seeking to foreclose 
on the three mortgaged properties.  Subsequently, in exchange for BJC's promise to
pay the 2008 property taxes and make a $150,000 interest payment by May 31, 
2009, Palmetto approved a payment deferral request and agreed to refrain from
seeking foreclosure through May 31, 2009.  Bellamy, accompanied by Brother and 
Uncle, hand-delivered a certified check in the amount of $95,000 to Small on 
February 3, 2009. Palmetto's payment deferral included the following language:
"Customer paid $95,000.00 in delinquent interest and attorney fees.  Advancing to 
May 2009 to give them time to sell the property and pay us off.  Loan remains in 
default and all sums due and payable."
BJC paid the 2008 property taxes on February 5, 2009, and Palmetto voluntarily 
dismissed the initial foreclosure action on February 13, 2009. On March 23, 2009, 
Bhupendra Patel, a long-time business associate of Uncle, began managing the 
hotel properties and continued to manage the properties for nearly a year after the 
commencement of the foreclosure action at issue in this appeal.3 As manager, 
Patel was paid $60,000 per year and was responsible for the day-to-day operations 
of Emerald Shores and Rainbow Court, as well as paying bills, making deposits, 
making repairs, maintaining the pool, and taking care of the grounds.   
Patel opened two checking accounts at Palmetto, one for Emerald Shores and one 
for Rainbow Court. While manager, Patel never made payments to Palmetto.  He 
did, however, make payments to Uncle in the amount of $20,000; Uncle's brother, 
Wilbur Jones (Jones), in the amount of $50,000; and himself in the amount of 
$30,000. In their depositions, Patel and Uncle testified that the payments made to 
Uncle and Jones were reimbursements for loans made to Emerald Shores and 
Rainbow Court. As manager, Patel also signed an agreement allowing three of 
Rainbow Court's rental property tenants to reside in their units "with my
permission at no monetary cost to them for the year of 2010."  The agreement
3 At his deposition, Uncle testified that he had personally loaned Patel "a couple 
million" over their twenty-five-year relationship, and that together, Uncle and 
Godwin had loaned Patel a substantial amount of money over the years.  
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specified that "[r]ent and utilities including water, gas, electric, basic cable, and 
internet ([R]oad Runner) are included in this agreement (Telephone is excluded)."   
On or around March 27, 2009, Palmetto retained counsel to draft the documents 
necessary to sell the 2008 Note. Thereafter, Palmetto hired C. Vernon Hammond 
to appraise the various properties associated with the 2005 Mortgages.  Hammond 
valued the mortgaged properties at $6,465,000 collectively: Emerald Shores at 
$3,750,000; Rainbow Court at $1,700,000; and the rental properties, including 
Bellamy's duplex, at $1,015,000.  On May 31, 2009, BJC failed to make the 
remaining $55,000 payment to Palmetto.  On June 4, 2009, Palmetto filed a lis 
pendens against the hotels; on June 11, 2009, Palmetto filed the present 
commercial foreclosure action. 
On June 15, 2009, Uncle and Godwin filed articles of organization with the South 
Carolina Secretary of State creating H&M, with Uncle as the company's sole 
member.  Although Godwin assisted Uncle in forming H&M and served as its 
registered agent, he had no interest in the company until October 2009, when he 
purchased a fifty percent membership interest.  Appellants allege that H&M is a 
"sham corporation being used by its principal, [Uncle], in an attempt to escape 
liability . . . [H&M] carried on no business, had no assets, [and] no means of 
revenue production other than being funded by [Uncle] and later Godwin in an 
attempt to distance itself from the pre-incorporation activities of its members."4
On June 24, 2009, Uncle and Palmetto entered into a loan sales agreement 
(Agreement).5 Pursuant to the Agreement, Palmetto paid for all of H&M's legal 
fees associated with the present foreclosure action.  On June 30, 2009, Palmetto 
assigned the 2008 Note, the 2005 Mortgages, and the Loan Documents, which 
consisted of the 2005 Assignments, the 2008 CSA, and the UCC-1, to H&M for 
$5,000,000. Additionally, Palmetto loaned H&M $4,750,000 at a 5% interest rate 
to finance the purchase. That same day, Uncle delivered a cashier's check in the 
4 On October 27, 2009, H&M opened an account at Palmetto; Uncle and Godwin 
each deposited $5000. 
5 Palmetto did not require H&M—a brand new entity with no history of income, 
liability, or credit worthiness—to fill out a loan application, nor did it require 
approval from the bank's loan committee.  
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amount of $250,000 to Palmetto, and in his capacity as H&M's sole member, 
executed a promissory note on behalf of H&M (H&M Note).
The terms of the H&M Note called for "56 monthly interest payments ranging 
from $18472.22 to $81805.56 beginning 11-01-2009 and 1 payment of 
$4,769,131.94 on 06-30-2014."  The additional terms of the H&M Note called for 
"[H&M] to provide a principal reduction in the amount of $750,000.00 by 10-15-
09" and that "upon [] default of terms contained herein, [the] interest rate is 
increased from 5.00% per annum to 8.00% per annum." The H&M Note was 
secured by a collateral assignment, pledge agreement, and security account 
Palmetto CD. Pursuant to the borrower's settlement statement, the principal 
amount of the new loan (H&M Loan) was $4,750,000, the total due from borrower 
was $250,000, and the balance to borrower was $0. At his deposition, Uncle 
testified that he loaned H&M $1,000,000 to put into a CD with Palmetto to serve 
as interest payment for the five-year term of the loan to H&M. 
On September 11, 2009, the Honorable Steven H. John signed a consent order 
substituting H&M as the plaintiff in the foreclosure action.6  On September 22, 
2009, H&M filed an amended complaint seeking foreclosure, claim and delivery, 
and the appointment of a receiver.  
On November 4, 2009, Appellants answered H&M's amended complaint.  On June 
9, 2010, Appellants filed an amended answer, counterclaims against H&M, and a 
third-party complaint against Palmetto and Individual Respondents. Against 
H&M, Appellants counterclaimed for (1) breach of contract, (2) breach of contract 
accompanied by fraudulent act, (3) civil conspiracy, (4) fraud, (5) conversion, (6) 
violation of the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act (SCUTPA),7 (7) tortious 
interference with contractual relationship, and (8) intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.  
Appellants' third-party complaint set forth the following claims against Individual 
Respondents: (1) civil conspiracy, (2) conversion, (3) tortious interference with a 
contractual relationship, and (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress.
6 The order substituting H&M as the plaintiff in the foreclosure action was not 
appealed. 
7 S.C. Code Ann. §§ 39-5-10 to -180 (1985 & Supp. 2014).
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Appellants also sued Uncle individually for breach of fiduciary duty.  Appellants 
sued Palmetto for (1) breach of contract, (2) breach of contract accompanied by 
fraudulent act, (3) civil conspiracy, (4) fraud, (5) conversion, (6) violation of 
SCUTPA, and (7) intentional infliction of emotional distress.
H&M filed a motion seeking the appointment of a receiver, specifically requesting 
that Patel be appointed. The circuit court heard the motion on December 8, 2009, 
granting H&M's motion to appoint a receiver, but denying its request to appoint 
Patel. In an April 20, 2010 order, the circuit court appointed Kenan L. Walker of 
Waccamaw Land & Timber, LLC, receiver for the properties secured by the Loan 
Documents.8
Individual Respondents filed motions to strike and dismiss in response to the third-
party claims.  The circuit court heard these motions on September 23, 2010. In its 
October 15, 2010 order, the circuit court declined to rule on the motion to dismiss 
and concluded that Appellants' third-party claims for breach of contract, breach of 
contract accompanied by a fraudulent act, and civil conspiracy were proper under 
Rule 14, SCRCP. The circuit court struck Appellant's remaining third-party claims 
against Individual Respondents, including the breach of fiduciary duty claim
against Uncle, as improper under Rule 14, SCRCP. Finally, the circuit court 
ordered stricken Appellants' remaining third-party claims for fraud and unfair trade 
practices against Palmetto.9
On April 14, 2011, the Honorable William H. Seals, Jr. heard Individual 
Respondents' Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP, motion to dismiss Appellants' third-party 
claim for civil conspiracy. The circuit court granted this motion in an order filed 
April 21, 2011 (Order #1).  Appellants moved to reconsider Order #1 on May 5, 
2011; the circuit court denied the motion by order filed November 30, 2011 (Order
#2). 
On April 18, 2011, H&M moved for summary judgment as to Appellants'
counterclaims.  H&M filed its own motion for summary judgment on the 
foreclosure and claim and delivery causes of action on May 3, 2011. Palmetto 
moved for summary judgment on Appellants' third-party claims on May 2, 2011. 
Judge Seals heard the three summary judgment motions on May 12, 2011.
8 The order appointing Walker as receiver was not appealed.
9 This October 15, 2010 order was not appealed.
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In its June 6, 2011 order (Order #3), the circuit court granted Palmetto's motion for 
summary judgment on Appellants' third-party claims for breach of contract, breach 
of contract accompanied by fraudulent act, and civil conspiracy.  In a separate June 
6, 2011 order (Order #4), the circuit court granted H&M's motion for summary 
judgment as to all of Appellants' counterclaims.  In a third order, also dated June 6, 
2011, the circuit court denied H&M's motion for summary judgment on its claims
for foreclosure and claim and delivery.
On June 6, 2011, H&M moved to strike Appellants' jury trial request, arguing that 
"[t]his matter involves the foreclosure of real property mortgages, which is 
particularly appropriate for a non-jury trial." The circuit court heard this motion on 
August 24, 2011, concluding that "the only affirmative claims that remain pending 
in this case are those asserted by H&M."  The circuit court granted H&M's motion 
to strike the jury trial demand by order filed September 29, 2011 (Order #5).
On June 7, 2011, Appellants moved for reconsideration of Order #3 and Order #4.
On July 27, 2011, the circuit court denied Appellants' motion to reconsider Order 
#3 (Order #6). Likewise, on July 28, 2011, the circuit court denied Appellants'
motion to reconsider Order # 4 (Order #7).  This appeal followed. 
LAW/ANALYSIS 
I. Individual Respondents' Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss
Appellants contend that because they set forth the necessary allegations of fact, 
law, and special damages sufficient to state a civil conspiracy claim10 against 
Individual Respondents, the circuit court erred in dismissing this claim against 
Uncle, Godwin, and Patel.  We disagree that Appellants properly pled special 
damages and affirm the circuit court's dismissal of the civil conspiracy claim.  See 
Rule 9(g), SCRCP ("When items of special damage are claimed, they shall be 
specifically stated.").   
10 "A civil conspiracy exists when there is (1) a combination of two or more 
persons, (2) for the purpose of injuring the plaintiff, (3) which causes the plaintiff 
special damage." Robertson v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 350 S.C. 339, 348, 565 
S.E.2d 309, 314 (Ct. App. 2002). "It is essential that the plaintiff prove all of these 
elements in order to recover." Pye v. Estate of Fox, 369 S.C. 555, 567, 633 S.E.2d 
505, 511 (2006). 
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"A ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) must be based solely on 
the factual allegations set forth in the complaint, and the court must consider all 
well-pled allegations as true." Fabian v. Lindsay, 410 S.C. 475, 481, 765 S.E.2d 
132, 136 (2014) (quoting Disabato v. S.C. Ass'n of Sch. Adm'rs, 404 S.C. 433, 441, 
746 S.E.2d 329, 333 (2013)). "On appeal from the dismissal of a case pursuant to 
Rule 12(b)(6), an appellate court applies the same standard of review as the trial 
court." Rydde v. Morris, 381 S.C. 643, 646, 675 S.E.2d 431, 433 (2009).
Therefore, this court must "construe the complaint in a light most favorable to the 
nonmovant and determine if the 'facts alleged and the inferences reasonably 
deducible from the pleadings would entitle the plaintiff to relief on any theory of 
the case.'" Id. (quoting Williams v. Condon, 347 S.C. 227, 233, 553 S.E.2d 496, 
499 (Ct. App. 2001)). If the facts and inferences drawn from the facts alleged in 
the complaint, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, would entitle the 
plaintiff to relief on any theory, then the grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim is improper.  Clearwater Tr. v. Bunting, 367 S.C. 340, 343, 626 
S.E.2d 334, 335 (2006). "Furthermore, the complaint should not be dismissed 
merely because the court doubts the plaintiff will prevail in the action."  Spence v. 
Spence, 368 S.C. 106, 116–17, 628 S.E.2d 869, 874 (2006).   
Our review of the record reveals the damages sought in the conspiracy cause of 
action are identical to those sought in Appellants' causes of action for fraud, breach 
of contract accompanied by fraud, conversion, interference with contractual 
relationship, and breach of fiduciary duty. See Pye, 369 S.C. at 568, 633 S.E.2d at 
511 ("Because the quiddity of a civil conspiracy claim is the damage resulting to 
the plaintiff, the damages alleged must go beyond the damages alleged in other 
causes of action."); Hackworth v. Greywood at Hammett, LLC, 385 S.C. 110, 117, 
682 S.E.2d 871, 875 (Ct. App. 2009) ("If a plaintiff merely repeats the damages 
from another claim instead of specifically listing special damages as part of their 
civil conspiracy claim, their conspiracy claim should be dismissed.").  Moreover, at 
oral argument before this court, Appellants conceded that they failed to plead with 
specificity any special damages in their third-party action and counterclaim for 
conspiracy. Accordingly, we find the circuit court properly dismissed Appellant's
civil conspiracy claim against Individual Respondents. 
II. Summary Judgment 
"An appellate court reviews the granting of summary judgment under the same
standard applied by the trial court under Rule 56(c), SCRCP."  Bovain v. Canal 
Ins., 383 S.C. 100, 105, 678 S.E.2d 422, 424 (2009).  Rule 56(c), SCRCP, provides 
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that "a trial court may grant a motion for summary judgment 'if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'"  Id.  (quoting 
Rule 56(c), SCRCP). "In determining whether any triable issues of fact exist, the 
evidence and all inferences which can be reasonably drawn from the evidence must 
be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party."  Hancock v. Mid-
South Mgmt. Co., Inc., 381 S.C. 326, 329–30, 673 S.E.2d 801, 802 (2009).  "[I]n 
cases applying the preponderance of the evidence burden of proof, the non-moving 
party is only required to submit a mere scintilla of evidence in order to withstand a 
motion for summary judgment."  Id. at 330, 673 S.E.2d at 803. "However, in cases 
requiring a heightened burden of proof . . . the non-moving party must submit more 
than a mere scintilla of evidence to withstand a motion for summary judgment."  
Id. at 330–31, 673 S.E.2d at 803. 
A. Appellants' Third-Party Claims against Palmetto 
Appellants argue that because they submitted evidence "far exceeding the 'mere 
scintilla' standard," the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment on their 
third-party claims against Palmetto for breach of contract, breach of contract 
accompanied by fraudulent act, and civil conspiracy.11  Appellants further contend 
that Palmetto "breached [its] duty of good faith and fair dealing under the loan 
documents" and "breached [its] obligation of confidentiality concerning the 
lending relationship." We disagree.   
11 The failure to plead special damages is fatal to Appellants' third-party civil 
conspiracy claim against Palmetto.  See Part I, supra. 
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1. Breach of Contract12
"The elements for a breach of contract are the existence of a contract, its breach, 
and damages caused by such breach."  S. Glass & Plastics Co. v. Kemper, 399 S.C. 
483, 491–92, 732 S.E.2d 205, 209 (Ct. App. 2012).  "The general rule is that for a 
breach of contract the [breaching party] is liable for whatever damages follow as a 
natural consequence and a proximate result of such breach."  Id. at 492, 732 S.E.2d 
at 209 (quoting Fuller v. E. Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 240 S.C. 75, 89, 124 S.E.2d 602, 
610 (1962)). However, one who seeks to recover damages for breach of a contract
must demonstrate that he has performed his part of the contract, "or at least that he
was, at the appropriate time, able, ready, and willing to perform it."  Swinton Creek 
Nursery v. Edisto Farm Credit, ACA, 334 S.C. 469, 487, 514 S.E.2d 126, 135 
(1999) (quoting Parks v. Lyons, 219 S.C. 40, 48, 64 S.E.2d 123, 126 (1951)).
It is uncontested that a contractual relationship existed between Palmetto and 
Appellants. It is further uncontested that Appellants were in default when they 
failed to make the required balloon payment on January 17, 2009, and again when 
they failed pay the balance on the $150,000 interest payment by May 31, 2009. 
When asked why the payment was not made on or before May 31, 2009, Bellamy
testified that the payment could have been made but was not made, and that she 
thought Uncle and Patel were going to ensure that the payment was made by the 
12 Appellants did not assert their argument regarding their unawareness of 
Palmetto's letter offering to renegotiate the terms of the 2008 Note until their 
motion to reconsider the entry of summary judgment.  In their amended answer, 
counterclaims, and third-party complaint, Appellants make no claim that Palmetto 
mailed the letter to an address at which it knew Appellants would not receive the 
letter. Moreover, Appellants did not make this argument in their memorandum in 
opposition to Palmetto's motion for summary judgment or at the motions hearing. 
Accordingly, we find this argument is not preserved for appellate review.  See 
Kiawah Prop. Owners Grp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of S.C., 359 S.C. 105, 113, 597 
S.E.2d 145, 149 (2004) (finding the issue is not preserved because a party may not 
raise an issue in a motion to reconsider, alter, or amend a judgment that could have 
been presented prior to the judgment); Hickman v. Hickman, 301 S.C. 455, 456, 
392 S.E.2d 481, 482 (Ct. App. 1990) ("A party cannot use Rule 59(e) to present to 
the court an issue the party could have raised prior to judgment but did not.").   
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deadline. Therefore, even if Palmetto breached its contract with Appellants, 
Appellants failed to demonstrate that they performed, or that they were even able 
to perform, their own obligation.  
"[T]here exists in every contract an implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing." Commercial Credit Corp. v. Nelson Motors, Inc., 247 S.C. 360, 367, 147 
S.E.2d 481, 484 (1966). "However, there is no breach of an implied covenant of 
good faith where a party to a contract has done what provisions of the contract 
expressly gave him the right to do."  Adams v. G.J. Creel & Sons, Inc., 320 S.C. 
274, 277, 465 S.E.2d 84, 85 (1995).  "Moreover, entering into an agreement, with 
no intention of keeping such agreement, constitutes fraudulent misrepresentation; 
however, mere breach of contract does not constitute fraud."  Id. 
A review of the record reveals that Palmetto (1) renegotiated and renewed the Loan 
in 2007 and again in 2008, (2) agreed to renegotiate a renewal of the Loan in 
November 2008 and February 2009, (3) approved BJC's request for payment 
deferral, and (4) voluntarily dismissed its original foreclosure action against BJC.
There is no language in the 2008 Note prohibiting Palmetto from selling or 
assigning the 2008 Note, 2005 Mortgages, or the Loan Documents.  Additionally, 
there is no evidence that Palmetto prevented the $55,000 payment from being 
made or that Palmetto refused to accept payment.  Therefore, we find Palmetto did 
not breach any "duty of good faith and fair dealing under the loan documents."  
"The normal bank-depositor arrangement creates a creditor-debtor relationship 
rather than a fiduciary one."  Burwell v. S.C. Nat'l Bank, 288 S.C. 34, 40, 340 
S.E.2d 786, 790 (1986). However, "[i]n limited circumstances . . . a fiduciary 
relationship may be created between a bank and a customer if the bank undertakes 
to advise the customer as a part of the services the bank offers."  Id.  "Such a 
relationship charges the bank with a duty to disclose material facts which may 
affect its customers' interest."  Id. at 40–41, 340 S.E.2d at 790. 
Although it is clear that Bellamy, in her capacity as BJC's managing member, 
trusted Small, there is no evidence that she reposed a special trust in him.  In her 
deposition, Bellamy testified that Small assured her that he would not discuss 
BJC's loan with anyone else. However, there is no evidence that Palmetto had a 
contractual duty not to disclose information about the 2008 Note to a potential 
purchaser once the loan was in default.  Consequently, Palmetto was within its 
legal rights to disclose information about the 2008 Note to Uncle.  Furthermore, 
BJC could not have reasonably believed that Small was acting on BJC's behalf.  
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Therefore, Palmetto did not breach any "obligation of confidentiality concerning 
the lending relationship." Accordingly, we find the circuit court properly granted 
Palmetto's motion for summary judgment as to Appellants' third-party breach of 
contract claim. 
2. Breach of Contract Accompanied by Fraudulent Act 
South Carolina has long recognized a plaintiff's right to recover punitive damages 
for a breach of contract accompanied by fraudulent act.  See, e.g., Welborn v. 
Dixon, 70 S.C. 108, 117, 49 S.E. 232, 235 (1904) (recognizing that where a breach 
of contract is accompanied with a fraudulent act, punitive damages may be 
recoverable). In order to maintain a claim for breach of contract accompanied by 
fraudulent act, a plaintiff must prove three elements: (1) a breach of contract; (2) 
fraudulent intent relating to the breaching of the contract, not merely to its making; 
and (3) a fraudulent act accompanying the breach.  Floyd v. Country Squire Mobile 
Homes, Inc., 287 S.C. 51, 53–54, 336 S.E.2d 502, 503–04 (Ct. App. 1985) 
(citations omitted).   
There is no evidence in the record, however, that Palmetto breached its contract 
with Appellants. This is fatal to Appellants' claim.  Consequently, we find the 
circuit court did not err in granting Palmetto's motion for summary judgment on 
Appellants' third-party claim for breach of contract accompanied by fraudulent act.   
B. Appellants' Counterclaims against H&M
Appellants argue the circuit court erred in granting H&M's motion for summary 
judgment on Appellants' counterclaims for breach of contract, breach of contract 
accompanied by a fraudulent act, and civil conspiracy13 because H&M was not a 
holder in due course of the 2008 Note and its accompanying mortgages, and was 
therefore subject to the same defenses and claims that Appellants asserted against 
Palmetto.  Appellants further contend that the circuit court erred in granting 
H&M's motion for summary judgment on their counterclaims for fraud, 
conversion, unfair trade practices, tortious interference with a contractual 
relationship, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.  We disagree. 
13 The failure to plead special damages is fatal to Appellants' counterclaim against
H&M. See Part I, supra.
43

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
   
 
1. Holder in Due Course 
Initially, we note that the circuit court never ruled on the issue of whether H&M 
was a holder in due course of the 2008 Note and accompanying mortgages.  See
Wilder Corp. v. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 76, 497 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1998) ("It is 
axiomatic that an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have 
been raised to and ruled upon by the trial judge to be preserved for appellate 
review."). Moreover, Appellants failed to specifically raise the argument regarding 
H&M's "holder in due course status" in their motion to reconsider the circuit 
court's order granting H&M's motion for summary judgment on Appellants'
counterclaims.  See Dodge v. Dodge, 332 S.C. 401, 418, 505 S.E.2d 344, 352–53 
(Ct. App. 1998) (explaining that father's argument regarding the amount of a fee is 
not preserved as the father failed to specifically raise the issue in his motion for 
reconsideration); see also Chastain v. Hiltabidle, 381 S.C. 508, 515, 673 S.E.2d 
826, 829 (Ct. App. 2009) ("When an issue is raised to but not ruled upon by the 
trial court, the issue is preserved for appeal only if the party raises the same issue 
in a Rule 59(e) motion."). Accordingly, we find this argument is not preserved.   
2. Breach of Contract 
Palmetto assigned the Loan Documents to H&M following Palmetto's
commencement of the present foreclosure action. Thus, H&M had a legal right to 
continue the pursuit of the foreclosure action.  See Twelfth RMA Partners, L.P. v.
Nat'l Safe Corp., 335 S.C. 635, 639–40, 518 S.E.2d 44, 46 (Ct. App. 1999) 
(explaining that an assignee "stands in the shoes of its assignor" and "should have 
all the same rights and privileges, including the right to sue on the contract, as the 
assignor").
Moreover, it is uncontested that Appellants failed to make the balloon payment on 
January 17, 2009, as required by the 2008 Note, and failed to make an interest 
payment to Palmetto in the amount of $55,000—the remainder due to satisfy the 
full interest payment of $150,000.  See Swinton, 334 S.C. at 487, 514 S.E.2d at 135 
(explaining that one who seeks to recover damages for breach of a contract must 
demonstrate that he has performed his part of the contract, "or at least that he was, 
at the appropriate time, able, ready, and willing to perform it").  Accordingly, we 
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find the circuit court properly granted H&M's motion for summary judgment on 
Appellants' counterclaim for breach of contract.14
3. Remaining Counterclaims 
As a preliminary matter, we note that Appellants failed to cite to any authority in 
their arguments on appeal regarding the circuit court's entry of summary judgment 
on their counterclaims for fraud, conversion, unfair trade practices, tortious 
interference with a contractual relationship, and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. See Rule 208(b)(1)(D), SCACR (requiring citation to authority in the 
argument section of an appellant's brief); Broom v. Jennifer J., 403 S.C. 96, 115, 
742 S.E.2d 382, 391 (2013) (finding an issue abandoned where the party's brief 
cited only one family court rule and presented no argument as to how the ruling 
was an abuse of discretion or constituted prejudice); State v. Lindsey, 394 S.C. 354, 
363, 714 S.E.2d 554, 558 (Ct. App. 2011) ("An issue is deemed abandoned and 
will not be considered on appeal if the argument is raised in a brief but not 
supported by authority.").  Additionally, Appellants' argument as to the entry of 
judgment on the counterclaims for conversion, unfair trade practices, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress is limited to one sentence.  See State v. 
Cutro, 332 S.C. 100, 108, 504 S.E.2d 324, 328 (1998) (holding a one-sentence 
argument is too conclusory to present any issue on appeal); First Sav. Bank v. 
McLean, 314 S.C. 361, 363, 444 S.E.2d 513, 514 (1994) (noting when a party fails 
to cite authority or when the argument is simply a conclusory statement, the party 
is deemed to have abandoned the issue on appeal).   
Furthermore, as to the cause of action for fraud, Appellants presented one 
argument below and another on appeal. See State v. Freiburger, 366 S.C. 125, 
134, 620 S.E.2d 737, 741 (2005) (explaining that an issue is not preserved for 
appeal where one ground is raised below and another ground is raised on appeal).  
In their counterclaims, memorandum in opposition to H&M's motion for summary 
judgment, and motion to reconsider the circuit court's order granting H&M's 
motion for summary judgment, Appellants alleged that H&M "fraudulently 
induced . . . Bellamy to execute a personal guarantee in January 2008 for the debt 
incurred in 2005." However, on appeal, Appellants argue the following: 
14As there is no evidence that Palmetto or H&M breached any contract with 
Appellants, we further find the circuit court properly granted summary judgment 
on the counterclaim against H&M for breach of contract accompanied by 
fraudulent act. See Floyd, 287 S.C. at 53–54, 336 S.E.2d at 503–04.
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[Palmetto]'s participation in the secret and 
undisclosed plan to "sell" the BJC loan to [Uncle] 
for $250,000, install Patel as manager over the 
properties and revenue to assure default in the May 
31 [, 2009] $150,000 payment, drafting the Loan 
Sale Agreement beginning in March[] 2009, and 
giving [Appellants] no written notice of default 
and opportunity to cure prior to filing the Lis 
Pendens on June 4, 2009[,] and the Complaint on 
June 11, 2009[,] are facts imputed to H&M from 
which a jury could find fraud . . . . 
Accordingly, we find that Appellants' arguments regarding the circuit court's entry 
of summary judgment on the remaining counterclaims are not preserved for 
appellate review. 
III. H&M's Action for Claim and Delivery 
Appellants assert that the circuit court erred in granting H&M's motion to strike 
their request for a jury trial on H&M's cause of action for claim and delivery; 
however, H&M contends that its action for claim and delivery is moot, as it was 
adjudicated in the circuit court's unappealed order appointing a receiver.  We agree 
with the circuit court's decision that the action for claim and delivery is moot. 
"An action in claim and delivery is an action at law for the recovery of specific 
personal property." First Palmetto State Bank & Trust Co. v. Boyles, 302 S.C. 
136, 138, 394 S.E.2d 313, 314 (1990).  "Whether a party is entitled to a jury trial is 
a question of law, which [an appellate court] reviews de novo, owing no deference 
to the [circuit court's] decision."  Carolina First Bank v. BADD, LLC, Op. No. 
27486 (S.C. Sup. Ct. filed Jan. 28, 2015) (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 4 at 23), reh'g 
granted (Apr. 9, 2015).
The cause of action for claim and delivery is governed by South Carolina Code 
sections 15-69-10 to -210 (2005).  Section 15-69-30 provides:  
When a delivery is claimed an affidavit must be made by 
the plaintiff or by someone on his behalf showing:
(1) That the plaintiff is the owner of the property 
claimed, particularly describing it, or is lawfully entitled 
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to the possession thereof by virtue of a special property 
therein, the facts in respect to which shall be set forth; 
(2) That the property is wrongfully detained by the 
defendant; 
(3) The alleged cause of the detention thereof, according 
to the affiant's best knowledge, information and belief; 
(4) That the property has not been taken for a tax, 
assessment or fine pursuant to a statute or seized under 
an execution or attachment against the property of the 
plaintiff or, if so seized, that it is by statute exempt from 
such seizure; and 
(5) The actual value of the property. 
Id.
It is undisputed that H&M failed to file such an affidavit. Likewise, H&M did not 
include any similar allegations in its amended complaint.  However, in the event 
the property described in the CSA and UCC-1 could not be voluntarily obtained, 
H&M demanded immediate possession of the property. H&M further demanded 
that the security property be sold and the proceeds applied to the debt.
The circuit court's order appointing a receiver states:  
[T]he real and personal properties which are the subjects 
of this proceeding are cash-producing properties . . . (the 
Properties) and that foreclosure of the Properties under 
the mortgages has been instituted. 
. . . . 
It is ordered, adjudged and decreed that Kenan L. Walker 
. . . be appointed receiver under the provisions of the 
mortgages to take possession of the Properties and to 
perform the acts and functions which are herein more 
particularly set forth.
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Appellants did not move for the circuit court to alter or amend this order, nor did 
they appeal it; thus, it is the law of the case. See Carolina Chloride, Inc. v. 
Richland Cty., 394 S.C. 154, 171–72, 714 S.E.2d 869, 878 (2011) (explaining that
an unchallenged ruling, right or wrong, becomes the law of the case).  Therefore, 
we affirm the circuit court's conclusion that the cause of action for claim and 
delivery was "previously adjudicated by the [circuit] court and [is] therefore 
moot."15
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we hold the circuit court properly granted Individual 
Respondents' Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the cause of action for civil 
conspiracy; properly entered summary judgment for Palmetto on the third-party 
claims for breach of contract, breach of contract accompanied by fraudulent act, 
and civil conspiracy; and properly granted H&M's motion for summary judgment 
on the counterclaims for breach of contract, breach of contract accompanied by 
fraudulent act, and civil conspiracy. Appellants' arguments that H&M is not a 
"holder in due course" and that the circuit court erroneously granted H&M's 
motion for summary judgment on their counterclaims for fraud, conversion, unfair 
trade practices, tortious interference with a contractual relationship, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress are not properly before the court.  Finally, as 
H&M's action for claim and delivery is moot, we need not address Appellants'
contention that the circuit court erred in striking their demand for a jury trial. 
Accordingly, the decisions of the circuit court are 
AFFIRMED. 
WILLIAMS and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.
15 Because we find that H&M's cause of action for claim and delivery is moot, we 
need not address Appellants' contention that the circuit court erred in striking their 
demand for a jury trial.  See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 
S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (ruling an appellate court need not 
review remaining issues when its determination of a prior issue is dispositive of the 
appeal).
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